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I Introduction
Korea's financial crisis has been as dramatic as it has been unexpected. In
fact, over a two-month period, from October. to December 1997, Korea
was reduced from being the world's 11th largest economy to an economy
surviving on overnight loans from the international money markets. "What
was so surprising about this crisis was that as late as October 1997, no one,
including the international credit rating agencies, could have predicted
that only two months later the foreign exchange market would collapse.
Nor that the Korean won would fall by more than 50% against the US
dollar between November 19, 1997, when Korea decided to approach the
IMF for a rescue plan, and December 24, 1997. During the same period,
the stock price index (KOSPI) tumbled to almost 350 from 498, and the
short-term market rate of interest shot up to 40% per annum.
Despite the IMF's rescue package and Korea's commitment to the clear-
ing of non-performing loans and the restructuring of troubled financial
institutions together with other badly needed economic reforms, Korean
banks suddenly found themselves cut off from the international financial
markets. During the last week of December, Korea was on the verge of
defaulting on its foreign debts. It narrowly avoided that fate by working
out a last minute emergency loan package put together by the IMF and
several of the G-7 countries.
Although Korean banks have been able to roll over some of their short-
term debts and market sentiments have seemingly once again begun to
turn in Korea's favour, much work remains for Korea in terms of normalis-
ing its ties to the international financial markets. At the time of my writing,
the IMF programme has not been as successful as originally expected in
terms of improving the markets' confidence in the Korean economy.
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the conference on the International
Financial System under Stress on January 26-27 in New York and to the G-24 Ministerial
Meeting on February 7-8 in Caracas, Venezuela. Rudi Dornbusch and Jack Boorman of the
IMF gave valuable comments on an earlier draft.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse both the internal and external
factors responsible for, and the consequences and policy responses to, the
financial turmoil plaguing Korea today. Section II describes the buildup to
the crisis, focusing on the process of financial liberalisation and its effects
on domestic investment. Section III discusses a series of developments
which culminated in the foreign exchange crisis in November and
December of 1997. Lessons and implications of the crisis for reform of the
international financial system are analysed in Section IV. Concluding
remarks can be found in the last section.
II Buildup to the Crisis
Korea rebounded strongly from its slowdown in growth in 1992 and 1993.
It did not experience the kind of double-digit growth that it had during the
period of 1986-89, but the economic growth from 1994 to the beginning
of 1997 was almost 8% on average per annum. It peaked in 1996 at nearly
9% (see Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1 Major Indicators of Korean Economy1
(in percentages)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 19971 19982
GDP 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 6.1 0.7
Consumption 9.3 6.8 5.3 7.0 7.2 6.9 5.0 -1.8
Fixed Investment 12.6 -0.8 5.2 11.8 11.7 7.1 -2.1 -12.1
Construction 13.0 -0.6 8.9 4.5 8.7 6.3 0.9 -6.1
Equipment 12.1 -1.1 -0.1 23.6 15.8 8.2 -5.9 -20.8
Commodity Exports 12.2 10.9 9.7 14.6 25.3 14.5 24.2 14.5
Commodity Imports 19.4 4.0 5.6 21.8 21.3 13.9 6.5 2.0
Gross Savings/GDP 35.9 34.7 35.1 35.2 35.9 34.3 34.2 34.8
Gross InvestmentlGDP 38.9 36.6 35.1 36.1 37.0 38.2 36.1 34.1
Increase of Stocks/GDP 0.5 0.0 -0.9 0.3 0.5 1.4
Current AccountlGDP -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.8 -4.8 -1.9 0.7
Terms of Trade 0.6 0.0 4.4 1.2 -3.6 -12.3 -10.3
Consumer Price Index 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 10.1
Producer Price Index 4.7 2.2 1.5 2.8 4.7 2.7 3.8 21.1
Notes:
1 Averages from the first quarter to the third quarter.
2 Korea Institute of Finance forecasts.
Source:
The Bank of Korea, National Income, various issues.
The Bank of Korea, Balance ofPayments, various issues.
The National Statistics Office, Consumer Price Index, various issues.
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Table 2 Balance of Payments
(in billions of dollars and percentages)
1 1996 1 I II III I 1997 N I 1 1998 1
Oct. Nov. Dec. I
Current Account
Trade
Exports
(%)
Imports
(%)
Invisible Trade
Transfers
Capital Account
-23.7 -7.4 -2.8 -2.1 -0.7 0.5 3.6 3.4 -8.9 3.0
-15.3 -5.4 -0.7 -0.0 -0.0 0.7 2.7 3.4 -2.8 10.9
128.3 30.6 35.6 34.6 12.1 12.1 12.6 36.8 137.5 147.8
(4.1) (-2.9) (9.3) (16.3) (7.7) (4.8) (7.5) (6.7) (7.2) (7.4)
143 .6 36.0 36.3 34.6 12 .1 11.4 9.9 33.4 140.4 136.7
(12.2) (5.7) (1.7) (-2.0) (-7.0) (-11.0) (-21.8) (-13.3) (-2.3) (-2.6)
-7.6 -1.8 -2.0 -1.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.2 -0.7 -6.3 -8.6
-0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.8
17.0 4.8 5.8 1.5 0.0 -2.0
N
'-l
Note:
1 Korea Institute of Finance forecasts.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Balance ofPayments, various issues.
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Like the earlier periods of high economic growth, the economy was
once again being fueled by exports. What was different during the 1994-96
period was that the high growth was also spurred by high investment. In
many respects, this high investment was a positive development as the
economy was coming out of a mild contraction during the 1992-93 period.
However, it was also responsible for a sharp increase in the current
account deficit and the financial and foreign exchange crisis in which
Korea finds itself today. Why exactly did Korean firms embark upon such
an investment spree? Two major developments were responsible: (i) the
strengthening of the yen; and (ii) the financial liberalisation and market
opening, which increased the availability of low-cost foreign credit.
High Yen, Financial Opening and Investment Boom
The appreciation of the yen brought about a sharp increase in the export
earnings of East Asian countries, as they were becoming more competitive
vis-a.-vis Japan in exports of manufactures. This, in turn, encouraged a
great deal of investment throughout East Asia. Korea benefited most out
of all the East Asian countries from the high yen because it competes
directly with]apan in many industries where]apan has been a predominant
exporter.
Figure I-A Savings/GDP, Investment/GDP and CurrentAccount/GDP
(%) (%)
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Source: The Bank of Korea, National Income, various issues.
The Bank of Korea, Balance ofPayments, various issues.
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Figure l-B Terms of Trade and Current Account
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During the third quarter of 1995, however, the Japanese yen reversed
itself and began to decline. Since then, the yen/dollar exchange rate has
continued to depreciate. At ·about the same time, the terms of trade moved
against Korea's favour and continued to deteriorate for the next two years.
The terms of trade shock, which in part reflected the stagnation in demand
for Korea's major export products, worsened the current account deficit
and triggered a deceleration of the economy (see Figures I-A and B).
Despite these adverse developments, the Korean policymakers were not
prepared to make any substantial adjustment in the won/dollar exchange
rate. As a result, the real, effective (trade adjusted) exchange rate appreciat-
ed for more than a year fr~m the third quarter of 1995 and thereafter
remained relatively stable until November of 1997, when the current
financial crisis broke out. The reason for the Korean policymakers' reluc-
tance to devalue the won during this period was not altogether clear. It is
speculated, however, that the policymakers, who were then preoccupied
with industrial restructuring, believed that a strong won would help facili-
tate the shifting of resources away from those industries such as light man-
ufacturing, where Korea was losing its competitiveness.
If this was indeed their policy objective, much of the effect of a strong
won was more than offset by a large increase in foreign capital inflows
facilitated by the deregulation of capital account transactions. This
increase in foreign capital inflows helped maintain a relatively strong won,
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but because the domestic interest rate was more than twice the level of
interest rates in international financial markets, the strong currency could
hardly deter Korean firms from expanding their investments.2
Between 1994 and 1996, net foreign capital inflows amounted to $52.3
billion, more than three times the total net inflows for the 1990-93 period
(see Table 3).3 Much of the inflows, which consisted of short-term liabil-
ities of domestic financial institutions and firms, were then channelled to
finance investment in Korea's major export-oriented industries: electron-
ics, automobiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. As a
result, investment jumped to 38.2% of GDP in 1996, from about 35%
three years earlier, which caused a large increase in the current account
deficit, reaching almost 5% of GDP (see Table 1).
Although the economy began to decelerate during the second half of
1996, largely due to the sharp decline in the prices of Korea's major export
products, including semiconductors, the large industrial groups, or chaebols,
which dominate Korea's manufacturing sector, were unable or unwilling to
adjust their production and investment. Their inventories were piling up,
but commercial banks were becoming less willing and more selective in
extending credit to these groups, as they were increasingly concerned
regarding these groups' growing losses and accumulating debts. Denied
sufficient credit from commercial banks, the industrial groups had to
secure high-cost, short-term loans from merchant banks. They also turned
to foreign financial institutions and markets for their financing of fixed
investment and inventories.
Industrial groups not only expanded their investment in domestic indus-
tries, but also in foreign countries. In 1994, Korea's total foreign invest-
ment rose to $2.3 billion from less than $1.3 billion a year earlier. Over the
next two years, it grew 33 and 36%, and much of this investment went to
Southeast Asia and Europe, no doubt financed by foreign credits.
While the available data are rather sketchy, foreign debts of domestic
firms amounted to $35.6 billion at the end of 1996. This figure jumped to
$43.2 billion a year later. Private foreign debts, as defined by the Korean
government, do not include the liabilities of the foreign subsidiaries and
branches of Korean firms, unless the payments of these debts are guaran-
teed by their parent firms. The exact amount of these liabilities was not
2 During the 1995-96 period, the short-term money market rates in Korea fluctuated
between 13 and 14%, while the Libor on 90-day US dollar deposits remained below 6% per
annum.
3 During the 1986-89 period, the capital and financial accounts generated a surplus on
the order of $16 billion.
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Table 3 Long-Term and Short-Tenn Capital and Financial Accounts Transaction (in billions of dollars and percentages)
1986-89 1990-93 1994-96 1994 1995 1996 Jan-Oct 97
Total Capital Account Balance (A) -5.4 5.2 17.4 11.6 17.4 23.2 14.3
Long-Term Capital Balance (B=C-D) -4.4 3.4 7.2 4.1 6.9 10.7 11.5
(BfA, %) (82.0) (65.2) (41.6) (35.7) (39.4) (46.2) (81.0)
Inflow (C) -3.5 3.9 11.8 6.4 12.3 16.9 16.6
(Foreign Direct Investments) (0.7) 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.2 2.0 1.9
(Foreign Securities Issued by Firms) n.a. 1.7 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.9
(Foreign Securities Issued by Fin. Institutions)1 -0.6 1.1 5.3 2.0 5.5 8.5 7.3
OutJlow(D) 0.9 0.5 4.6 2.2 5.4 7.1 5.0
(Overseas Direct Investments) 0.2 1.1 3.0 2.1 3.1 3.9 3.0
Short-Term Capital Balance (E=F-G) -1.0 1.8 10.1 0.7 10.6 12.5 2.7
(EfA, %) (18.0) (34.8) (58.4) (6.4) (6.1) (5.4) (1.9)
Inflow(F) -0.4 4.4 18.1 13.8 18.7 21.8 6.9
(Portfolio Investments)2 n.a. 2.2 3.5 2.5 2.9 5.1 2.8
(Short-Term Trade Credit) 0.0 0.5 3.8 2.7 4.0 4.8 3.5
(Short-Term Borrowings of Financial Institutions)3 0.5 0.5 6.0 4.1 7.6 6.3 -1.1
(Inter-Office Accounts)4 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.9 3.0
OutJlow(G) 0.6 2.6 7.9 6.4 8.1 9.3 3.2
(Portfolio Investments)5 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.2
(Assets of Deposit Money Banks)6 0.2 1.8 4.8 4.1 5.4 5.0 1.4
(Assets ofMerchant Banks and Develop. Inst.)7 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.5 2.0 0.4
n.a. = not available
Notes
1 Domestic financial institutions include deposit money banks, foreign bank branches in Korea, development institutions, and merchant banks.
2 Portfolio investments in domestic securities by foreign investors.
3 Include short-term liabilities of merchant banks and development institutions and commercial paper and other short-term securities issued by
deposit money banks.
4 Borrowings of foreign bank branches in Korea from their home offices.
5 Portfolio investments in foreign securities by domestic investors.
6 Changes in foreign currency assets of oversea branches of domestic deposit money banks.
7 Changes in foreign currency assets of oversea branches of domestic merchant banks and development institutes.
8 Annual average of the period.
V,J
~ Source: "Capital Account Liberalization and the Structural Change of the Capital Account in Korea", In: Monthly Bulletin, Bank of Korea,
December, 1997.
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known, but it was estimated to be over $51 billion at the end of June
1997.4
Why were Korea's industrial groups so inflexible and slow in adjusting
their investment and output in response to the changes in the internal and
external environment? The answer lies in some of the salient characteris-
tics of the Korean chaebols. One such characteristic has been their tendency
to compete more for market share than for profits. This feature is often
attributed in part to the Japanese model of government-led economic
development, but it was largely the consequence of an industrial policy
geared towards obtaining scale economies in major export industries at the
early stage of their development. Every major chaebol was pursuing business
in only the tried and proven industries. Therefore, profits were driven
down, forcing them to carve out the largest market shares that they pos-
sibly could and to also diversify at the first opportunity into new industries
which promised high profits.
As a result, all of the largest chaebols went on to expand their investment
in Korea's major industries so as not to lose their relative positions in the
economy. Furthermore, the rigid and bureaucratic management system,
where the decisionmaking was concentrated at the top, made it difficult for
the chaebols to adjust their investment and production to changes in market
conditions as rapidly as they should. Because practically all of the chaebols
are family owned, they were reluctant to issue equities, as doing so could
dilute their management control. These characteristics, together with the
underdevelopment of the domestic capital markets, have caused the chaebols
to become highly leveraged. A recent survey shows that the average debt-
equity ratio of the 30 largest chaebols was more than 380% in 1996, four
times as high as that of Taiwan.5 As it turned out, the high leverage of the
corporate sector proved to be the Korean economy's greatest structural
weakness. Much of the expansion in investment could only be possible by
taking on enormous amounts of debt, and the rapid debt accumulation by
the chaebols meant that the economy as a whole became more susceptible to
a slowdown in growth and a financial crisis.
The new government that came to power early in 1993 mounted a cam-
paign of market deregulation and opening, as it was determined to rely
more on the market for the management of the economy. The WTO
agreement did not leave much room for industrial policy, and market liber-
alisation took away what was left of the government's control of the pro-
4 Since a large amount of private foreign debts will come due in the spring of 1998, it is
feared that the inability of private firms to service their foreign debts could destabilise the
financial markets once again.
5 Economic Review No. 29, Korea Institute of Economic and Technology, December
29, 1979.
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duction and investment activities of the large conglomerates and enter-
prises. The deregulation efforts succeeded in freeing the chaebols from the
government, but without instituting either internal or external mechanisms
of monitoring and controlling their management to replace the
government's former role. Small stockholders have never had much voice
in the management of the chaebols. The government, unlike during previ-
ous decades, was suddenly unable to control or coordinate the investment
activities of the chaebols. The chaebols were free to do whatever they
believed was in their best interests.
Financial Dereg;ulation with Inadequate Supervision
From the 1960s and through the 1980s, capital account transactions had
been tightly regulated. Many restrictions on capital movements in and out
of the country were put in place to facilitate the government's industrial
policy and to minimise the destabilising effects of short-term capital flows
on the economy. All of this began to change in the early 1990s. By this
time, the effectiveness and viability of Korea's interventionist regime had
come into question due to the increasing complexity of the economy.
Korea had also come under increasing pressure from developed countries,
led by the US, to liberalise its financial sector, so Korea found itself beset
by necessity to pursue liberalisation from both within and without.
Financial market deregulation and market opening began in earnest in
1993, immediately after the inauguration of the current administration,
and it was accelerated by Korea's accession to the GEeD as its 29th mem-
ber. Less than five years have elapsed since then, but the Korean experi-
ence demonstrates, as have many other cases of financial market opening,
that unless financial market opening in emerging market economies is
properly managed, with adequate supervision, it could easily lead to a
boom and bust cycle during the transition period.
Although the market deregulation and opening in Korea had been car-
ried out in a gradual and piecemeal manner, it led to a surge in foreign
capital inflows during the 1994-97 period, much of which were short-term
and speculative. With the acceleration in financial liberalisation, domestic
financial institutions were allowed greater freedom in managing their
assets and liabilities, in particular in borrowing from international financial
markets. This greater freedom, together with the moral hazard inherent in
the Korean financial system, also weakened their discipline in lending, in
particular to large industrial groups, and in managing market risk. In fact,
Korean financial institutions took much greater risks in their investment in
foreign securities with borrowed short-term funds than prudent manage-
ment would have permitted, thereby exposing themselves to the problem
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of balance sheet-mismatch. These developments made the Korean econo-
my highly vulnerable to the speculative currency attack and liquidity crisis.
In retrospect, Korean financial institutions were not adequately pre-
pared for the financial market opening because they had not yet developed
expertise in credit analysis, risk management, and due diligence. They had
had little experience in foreign exchange and securities trading and with
international banking in general. The supervisory authorities were not
monitoring and regulating their international financial activities as much as
they should have, because they were pressured to overhaul the regulatory
system to make it more compatible with a liberalised system. They elimi-
nated and relaxed many restrictions and control measures, but failed to
install in their place a new system of prudential regulation needed to safe-
guard the stability and soundness of financial institutions.
During the three-year period from 1994-96, total capital flows (inflow
plus outflows) rose to 47% of GDP from less than 30% during the preced-
ing three-year period (see Table 4). Net inflows during the same period
amounted to $52.2 billion, and unlike in the 1980s, the bulk of these
inflows consisted of short-term borrowings with maturities less than one
year, accounting for 62 % of total net inflows, compared to 37% during the
1990-93 period (see Table 3).
Short-term capital inflows included foreigners' portfolio investment
(mostly equity investment), trade credit, short-term borrowings by banks
and other financial institutions, as well as borrowings by Korean branches
of foreign banks from their headquarters. The aggregate as well as individ-
ual ceiling on foreigners' investment in equities have gradually been raised
since 1992. This relaxation, together with the favourable prospects of the
Korean economy, induced a surge in foreigners' equity investment during
the 1994-96 period. However, compared to other forms of short-term cap-
ital inflows, the amount of portfolio investment was modest. The inflow in
the form of trade credit jumped more than seven-fold, bank borrowings
eleven-fold, and borrowing of Korean branches of foreign banks from their
home offices more than seven-fold between th·e two sub-periods.
There were several reasons for the large increase in short-term capital
inflows. One reason was the rapid growth in trade volume which required
an equal increase in import and export-related credits. However, the
growth in short-term capital inflows outpaced the expansion in trade. This
discrepancy can be explained by the use of trade credit facilities as the
routes of capital inflow which, in turn, were induced by the high interest
rate differentials between the domestic and foreign financial markets in the
context of stable foreign exchange rates. Deregulation of trade credits led
to a lengthening of the periods of deferred and installment payments for
imports ranging from six months to three years. Exporters were also
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V,J
V1
Table 4 Capital and Financial Accounts of Korea
(in billions of dollars and percentages)
1986-89 1990-93 1994-96 1994 1995 1996 Jan-Oct 97
Total Capital Inflow (A) 87.1 188.6 342.3 82.8 117.4 142.1 119.2
(average annual growth rate) (3.8) (2.5) (33.4) (37.4) (41.8) (21.0) (4.2)
Total Capital Outflow(B) 108.4 169.0 290.1 71.1 100.1 118.9 104.9
(average annual growth rate) (9.1) (19.9) (28.1) (24.9) (40.7) (18.8) (10.0)
Total Capital Transactions (A~B) 195.5 357.7 632.5 153.9 217.5 261.0 22.45
(average annual growth rate) (6.0) (22.0) (30.9) (31.4) (41.3) (30.0) (6.8)
«A+B)/GDP) (31.8) (29.8) (47.3) (40.4) (47.6) (53.9)
Capital Account Balance l -21.5 20.9 52.2 11.6 17.4 23.2 14.3
Current Account Balance 33.7 -15.0 -37.2 -4.5 -8.9 -23.7 -23.2
Notes:
1 Capital account balance is different from total capital inflow (A) minus total capital outflow (B) because of the statistical errors resulting from
reclassifying the capital account balance.
Source:
"Capital Account Liberalization and the Structural Change of the Capital Account in Korea", In: Monthly Bulletin, Bank of Korea,
December, 1997.
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allowed to offer suppliers' credits to foreign importers with longer matur-
ities ranging from one to two years. The ceilings on export advances and
export downpayments were also raised. These changes contributed to a
large increase in trade credit. Commercial banks, for their part, had to
increase their foreign currency borrowings to accommodate the growing
demand for export and import financing; that is, to purchase the growing
volume of export bills and to finance imports on credit.
There was another reason for the surge in short-term bank borrowing.
Beginning in 1994, the ceiling on foreign currency loans by commercial
banks was lifted, but the ceiling on commercial banks' medium and long-
term borrowings from international financial markets was not. As a result,
commercial banks were forced to raise short-term credits to finance long-
term loans at home. Commercial banks were also attracted to short-term
financing because the costs of short-term borrowing were lower than for
issuing medium and long-term securities, largely because they had not
established sufficiently high credit ratings to borrow from the long-term
capital markets.
The external liabilities of commercial banks consist mostly of trade
related refinance, bank loans, and securities issued, including commercial
paper. Although commercial banks traditionally borrow at the short end of
the financial market and extend short-term loans, the rise in their short-
term indebtedness was alarming; the share of the short-term in total exter-
nalliabilities jumped to 79% in 1994 from less than 65% a year earlier (see
Table 5-A).6 Much of the increase came from the issuance of commercial
paper. Over the next two years, the share of short-term liabilities remained
well over 70%, but instead of issuing commercial paper, commercial banks
were relying on credit lines and loans for subloans, and other short-term
loans as the major sources of short-term foreign credit. Although precise
data and reliable information are not available, they were likely making
long-term foreign currency loans to their customers with lending resources
secured from the short-term money market, thereby creating a mismatch
problem. In retrospect, the mismatch problem made the management of
the financial crisis much more difficult than necessary.
-why did the Korean policymakers let banks and other financial institu-
tions borrow so much from the short-term money markets? -why did they
not open the domestic bond market and liberalise long-term external
financing? Perhaps they may have ignored the management of short-term
liabilities, because these liabilities do not add to the stock of foreign debts
6 The share of short-term in total external liabilities at merchant banks is relatively
lower, though the accuracy of their balance sheet figures have been questionable (see Table 5-
B).
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Table 5-A External Liabilities of Domestic Deposit Money Banks in Korea1
(end of period, millions of dollars and percentages)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
External Liabilities 7,220 (100) 6,554 (100) 10,941 (100) 18,942 (100) 26,708 (100)
Short-Term Liabilities 4,813 (66.7) 4,222 (6404) 8,077 (78.9) 14,642 (77.3) 19,582 (73.3)
Deposits 68 (1.0) 92 (104) 80 (0.7) 127 (0.7) 177 (0.7)
Call Money 399 (5.5) 467 (7.1) 1,062 (9.7) 1,581 (0.8) 2,026 (7.6)
Borrowings from Banks 4,346 (60.2) 3,663 (55.9) 7,493 (68.5) 12,934 (68.3) 17.,379 (65.1)
(Due to Banks)2 3,818 (52.9) 3,210 (49.0) 6,935 (63.4) 10,177 (53.7) 11,295 (42.3)
(Other Borrowings)3 528 (7.3) 453 (6.9) 558 (5.1) 2,757 (14.6) 6,084 (22.8)
Long-Term Liabilities 2,407 (33.3) 2,332 (35.6) 2,306 (21.1) 4,300 (22.7) 7,126 (26.7)
Borrowings from Banks 1,470 (2004) 1,503 (23.0) 1,159 (10.6) 1,129 (6.0) 758 (2.8)
Foreign Securities Issued. 666 (9.2) 572 (8.7) 778 (7.1) 2,872 (15.2) 6,141 (23.0)
Inter-Office Accounts 138 (1.9) 119 (1.8) 220 (2.0) 115 (0.6) 57 (0.2)
Others 133 (1.8) 138 (2.1) 149 (1.4) 184 (1.0) 170 (0.6)
Notes:
1 The figures in parentheses are percentages of total external liabilities.
2 The external liabilities due to banks include credit lines from the foreign banks and borrowings for sub-loans.
3 Other borrowings include commercial paper, CDs, and other short-term securities issued by the deposit money banks.
Source:
The Bank of Korea, Foreign Exchange Statistics, various issues.
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IJ.J Table 5-B External Liabilities ofMerchant Banks in Korea00 (end of period, millions of dollars and percentages)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
External Liabilities 1,774 (100) 1,450 (100) 1,820 (100) 3,872 (100) 5,942 (100)
Short-Term Liabilities 606 (34.2) 303 (20.9) 654 (35.9) 1,966 (50.7) 3,190 (53.7)
Deposits 28 (1.6) 19 (1.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Call Money 5 (1.6) 1 (7.1) 46 (2.5) 56 (1.5) 58 (1.0)
Borrowings from Banks 573 (32.3) 283 (55.9) 608 (33.4) 1,910 (49.3) 3,132 (52.7)
Long-term Liabilities 1,168 (65.8) 1,147 (79.1) 1,166 (64.1) 1,906 (49.2) 2,752 (46.3)
Borrowings from Banks 730 (41.2) 727 (50.1) 491 (27.0) 435 (11.2) 327 (5.5)
Foreign Securities Issued 437 (24.6) 419 (28.9) 674 (37.0) 1,470 (38.0) 2,388 (40.2)
Others 1 (0.1) 1,000 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 1 (0.0) 37 (0.6)
Note:
The figures in parentheses are percentages of total external liabilities.
Source:
The Bank of Korea, Foreign Exchange Statistics, various issues.
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as they mature and are paid off within a year, whereas long-term liabilities
do. The Korean authorities have not regulated short-term external credit
transactions of banks and the financial institutions because these transac-
tions are tied to the international financial services they provide. They may
have overlooked the possibilities that short-term loans could be rolled over
continuously and that short--term credit facilities could be abused as means
of financing long-term investment.
Although the deterioration in the quality of assets and prevalence of
short-term external financing were clearly visible, the supervisory author-
ities did not order the financial institutions to take corrective measures.
They did not do so, because nurtured in the old tradition of direct control
and bank examination, they had neither the resources nor experience in
monitoring and exercising regulatory power to maintain overall soundness
and profitability of financial institutions. Long relegated to the role of sup-
porting manufacturing industries under the control of government, banks
and other financial institutions had become accustomed to accommodating
much of the credit needs of the industrial conglomerates without necessar-
ily checking their creditworthiness. In fact, many commercial banks were
competing among themselves to win over these chaebols, as they were
regarded as prime customers with little credit risk.
As in Japan, Korean banks also consider it important to establish long-
term relationships with their customers by serving as their main banks.
This device is often alleged to be an efficient means of collecting informa-
tion and dealing with the information asymmetry problem. However, the
long-term relationship could be counterproductive in that banks often find
it difficult to keep their long-term customers at arm's length, in particular
if their customers are powerful chaebols. During the 1994-96 period, it
appears that banks failed to deal prudently with these conglomerates as if
they were in an implicit partnership and so were not able to curb their
excessive investment. This partnership also explains why the banks were
taken by surprise when their foreign customers and creditors severed ties
with them as the financial crisis unfolded. The banks never had expected
the foreigners to cut them off.
A search for the clues to the ongoing financial crisis in recent periods
has led to the auditing and examination of the asset and liability manage-
ment of financial institutions, including commercial banks. A preliminary
report of the examination is alarming, revealing how reckless these institu-
tions were in investing in foreign securities, engaging in the operation of
offshore funds, and in dealing in financial derivative products. According
to a recent report by the Securities Supervisory Board, Korean securities
firms and investment trust companies incurred heavy losses in their opera-
tions of offshore funds established in Malaysia, Ireland, and France. At the
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end of 1997, the total losses amounted to about $1.1 billion. Twenty-eight
Korean securities firms established 89 offshore funds and leveraged them
two to five times the capital base. Of the total investment of $2.6 billion,
$1.1 billion was their own capital and the remainder consisted of borrow-
ings from foreign sources. Disguised as foreign institutional investors, they
invested heavily in Korean stocks and high-risk securities issued by firms
and financial institutions in Southeast Asia. Other revelations show how
inept and inexperienced Korean financial institutions were in investing in
financial derivatives. Their investments became total losses.
According to a recent newspaper report, Korean merchant banking cor-
porations, which have been permitted to engage in international finance in
recent years, had borrowed $20 billion from the short end of the interna-
tional financial market by the end of October 1997. Not surprisingly, they
had invested their funds in highly risky securities issued by firms in
Southeast Asian countries. About 5% of their investments in October were
classified as non-performing assets.
III The Crisis in Full Force
Financial Market Developments in 1997
The investment boom supported by foreign credit could not last very long,
but locked in market share competition. Unable to layoff workers, the
chaebols were unwilling to adjust their production and hoped that the gov-
ernment would come in at a certain stage to rescue them, but it could not.
The number of corporate bankruptcies began to soar and so did the vol-
ume of non-performing loans at financial institutions. Over a six-month
period from December 1996 to June 1997, non-performing credits as a
proportion of total credits almost doubled (see Table 6). The first major
casualty of the slowdown in export growth and the terms of trade shock in
the second half of 1996 was the Hanbo group. Specialised in iron and steel,
it was the nation's 14th largest chaebol. As Hanbo was unable to meet
the payments of the principle and interest on its loans, the decision was
made to restructure it through a workout programme organised by its
creditor banks rather than to liquidate it. A few months later, it was placed
under court receivership because the workout programme did not succeed.
The investigation into the Hanbo collapse revealed that many loans to
this group had been made under political pressure, loans which Korean
financial institutions would not have granted on their own. The revelations
of the extent of the unholy ties between politicians and industry and the
scale of corruption shocked both the Korean people and the foreign in-
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Table 6 Non-Perfonning Credits of Financial Institutions
(in trillions of won)
December 1996 June 1997 December 1997
Commercial Banks
Total credits (A)
Non-performing credits (B=C+D)l
Substandard credits (C)2
Bad credits (D=E+F)3
Doubtful credits (E)4
Estimated loss (F)5
Non-performing credit ratio (B/A, %)
Bad credit ratio (D/A, %)
311.7
12.2
9.7
2.5
2.0
0.5
3.9
0.8
360.8
21.9
16.0
5.9
4.9
1.0
6.1
1.6
375.4
22.6
12.6
10.1
9.6
0.5
6.0
2.7
December 1996 October 1997 November 28,
1997
Merchant Banks
Total credits (G)6
Non-performing credits (H)7
Non-performing credit ratio (RIG, %)
79.9
1.3
1.6
85.7
3.9
4.5
84.5
5.1
6.0
Notes:
Non-performing credits include bad credits (which include the credits classified as
doubtful or estimated loss) and the credits classified as substandard.
Substandard credits are the credits out of total credits expected to be collected by selling
collateral extended to customers who have been in arrears for no less than six months or to
the issuer of dishonoured bills and checks, or to the firms which are under court
receivership.
3 Bad credits include the credits classified as doubtful or estimated loss.
4 Doubtful credits are the portions of credits out of total credits to customers in excess of
the amount expected to be collected classified as substandard that are expected to be a loss,
but have not yet been realised as such.
Estimated loss is the portion of credits out of total credits to customers in excess of the
amount expected to be collected classified as substandard that must be accounted as a loss,
because collection is not possible in a foreseeable period.
Credits at merchant banks include the CP discounting and factoring.
Non-performing credits at merchant banks include notes discounted and dishonoured;
notes discounted and dishonoured by firms under legal management; dishonoured notes
paid by the firms instead; and loans overdue by more than six months.
Source:
The Bank of Korea and the Association of Merchant Banks.
vestors. The pervasiveness of corruption discovered in Korea this past year
has been one of the major factors in foreign institutional investors' loss of
confidence in the government and in the economy in general, which no
doubt helped to bring about the crisis.7
7 For brevity, foreign institutional investors will be referred to as foreign investors.
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More high-profile bankruptcies followed, but the one debacle which no
doubt caused the government to lose a great deal of its credibility more
than any other was the near-bankruptcy of the Kia Group in July. At first,
it was decided that the Kia Group, which is the nation's 8th largest chaebol,
would also be covered by a workout programme, but this soon proved
impossible. Debate then raged as to whether or not the Kia Group should
be placed under court receivership, a prospect which the management of
Kia strongly opposed. Weeks passed by without any decisive action by the
government towards resolving this problem. Unable to find new investors
or to merge it with either of the other automakers, Kia was finally put into
liquidation proceedings in October.
By the first week of September, six chaebols including Kia had been
placed under a workout plan or had become insolvent. They accounted for
about 10.4% of the total assets of the 30 largest chaebols, not a large enough
amount to threaten the stability of the economy, but their demise made the
economic outlook more pessimistic than before. By this time, the Korean
public had become by and large disillusioned with the ineptness of the cur-
rent administration, which became a lame duck government. There
seemed to be no end to the bankruptcies and the economic slowdown had
already dragged on for nearly two years. Therefore, whatever economic
control the government had still held after liberalisation was now even fur-
ther compromised. With the next presidential election to be held in
December, there was no way the current administration was going to be
able to take any serious action to restore stability to the Korean financial
markets. The foreign investors knew this all too well, prompting some of
them to begin withdrawing their funds from the Korean stock market and
out of Korea in early September.
The behaviour of the government in its management of exchange rate
policy in the last three months leading up to the crisis did not help and, in
fact, exacerbated the financial problems. Exchange rate policy was rather
inconsistent and unpredictable, suggesting to foreign and domestic in-
vestors alike that the government was at a serious loss as to how to deal
with the deteriorating financial situation. The won had been under strong
depreciatory pressure since the early months of 1997. Time after time
throughout the year, the government would publicly state that it would
defend the won at a certain level, only to be forced to retreat and attempt
defending the won at a new level. When the won/dollar exchange rate
approached the psychologically important level of 1000 won per dollar, the
government made a goal line stand, intervening heavily in the market, but
then gave up suddenly several days later.
Between June and November, the central bank's reserve holdings fell by
$10 billion, as shown in Table 7. During the same period the central bank
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Table 7 Foreign Reserves of the Bank of Korea
(end of period, billions of dollars)
1996 1997 1998
March June Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.
Official Foreign Reserve (A) 33.2 29.2 33.3 30.4 30.5 24.4 20.4 23.5
Deposits at Overseas Branches (B) 3.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 16.9 11.3 11.0
Other (C) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Usable Reserves (A-B-C) 29.4 21.1 25.3 22.4 22.3 7.3 8.9 12.4
Note:
Official foreign reserve holdings are based on the IMF definition. Deposits at overseas branches are those deposits made by the Bank of Korea at
overseas branches of domestic commercial banks. In November, when the domestic commercial banks were unable to repay their loans from the
foreign banks, the Bank of Korea supported them by making foreign currency deposits at their overseas branches.
Source:
The Bank of Korea.
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sold $12 billion in the spot market and made forward sales amounting to
$7 billion in order to defend the won. The government further strained
investors' credulity during this time by failing to divulge the Bank of
Korea's actual level of foreign reserves or its forward market commit-
ments. It asserted that the Bank of Korea held about $30 billion dollars in
reserves, a figure which investors found implausible. The actual level of
usable reserves had already dropped below $22 billion in March. By the
end of November, it fell to $7 billion dollars.
Toward the end of October, it became clear to policymakers as well as
to market participants that the financial situation was getting out of con-
trol. Foreign investors moved out of the stock market in droves and
Korean banks were increasingly unable to roll over their short-term for-
eign loans. In order to avoid default, they were forced to turn to the Bank
of Korea for liquidity or to resort to the foreign overnight loan markets.
Yet, the authorities still failed to take any action, ignoring the growing cla-
mour for much-needed financial reform, as well as for the restructuring of
industry and the chaebols. On November 19, the government announced a
reform package which included measures for disposal of non-performing
loans and widening of the exchange rate fluctuation band. Under normal
circumstances, the package would have been seen as taking a serious step
toward restructuring the economy, but with the sense of panic rising by
the day, the market hardly noticed it.
Three days later, unable to control the situation·, the government made
public its decision to approach the IMF to ask for assistance. The negotia-
tions between the Korean government and the IMF were completed in a
record time of only 10 days, ending on December 3. The IMF agreed to
provide a total of $21 billion to be disbursed in 11 installments over a
three-year period from its emergency financing and other facilities. It also
secured financial commitments totalling $36 billion from the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries, as well as from inter-
national organisations, which would serve as a second line of defense. The
IMF's conditions required a tight monetary policy, a fiscal surplus, sweep-
ing financial reform, further liberalisation of the financial markets, and also
two conditions which were unusual to an IMF programme: greater flexibil-
ity in the labour market and restructuring of the chaebols.
Contrary to expectations, the swift and successful conclusion of the
negotiations did little to allay fears and stabilise the financial markets
including the foreign exchange market. The won/dollar exchange rate con-
tinued to depreciate. On many trading days, it actually hit the daily fluctu-
ation band, which had been widened to plus/minus 10% on November 20.
Interest rates began to soar while the stock price index went into a nose-
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dive. On December 16, the 10% band was lifted, and a free floating
exchange rate system was introduced. A few days later, the 25% interest
rate ceiling was also abolished, as it had become clear that interest rates
had to rise well above that level. Most of the capital controls were also
abolished. The limit on aggregate stock ownership by foreigners was raised
to 55%, the market for corporate bonds with maturities longer than three
years was opened up, and the short-term money market would also be
deregulated for foreigners' investment. The IMF financing package,
together with the conditions it set, did not help change the markets' senti-
ment. Many thought that Korea might not be able to comply with the
structural reforms mandated by the IMF and that the extremely tight mon-
etary and fiscal policies required of Korea under the IMF programme
would depress economic activity so much that, in fact, they would in the
long run undermine Korea's ability to service its foreign debt. This would
clearly defeat the purpose of the IMF programme. The rollover rate at
commercial banks fell to about 10%, market interest rates shot up to the
dizzying height of 40%, and the won/dollar exchange rate continued to
depreciate, reaching 1,995 won per dollar on December 23.
The financial situation was clearly unsustainable and rumours began to
circulate among the foreign investors that Korea might have to declare a
debt moratorium. The IMF and US Treasury clearly had to take stronger
measures to stop further haemorrhaging of the Korean economy. On
Christmas eve, the IMF and the G-7 countries came up with a $10 billion
emergency financing programme, drawing $8 billion from their second
line of defense.
The new package succeeded in turning market sentiment around as it
demonstrated the resolve of the IMF and G-7 to rescue Korea from finan-
cial collapse. It would actually seem that a new watershed has been
reached, as the IMF has clearly served as a lender of last resort in the East
Asian financial crisis.
In retrospect, sovereign credit ratings by credit rating agencies have also
complicated the management of the Korean crisis (see Table 8). In January
Table 8 Korea's Sovereign Credit Ratings
Jan. 97
Nov. 28, 97
Dec. 11,97
Dec. 22, 97
Moody's
Al
A3
Baa2
Bal
Jan. 97
Oct. 24, 97
Nov. 25, 97
Dec. 11,97
Dec. 22, 97
S&P
AA-
A+
A-
BBB-
B+
Source: Internet Websites of Moody's and Standard and Poors.
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1997, Moody's gave Korea a sovereign credit rating of Al and Standard
and Poors (S&P) gave it AA-. On November 28, Moody's lowered its rat-
ing to A3, and on October 24, S&P downgraded Korea to A+. Thus,
Moody's readjusted its rating downward twice and S&P three times before
the end 9f 1997. Whenever the sovereign rating was downgraded, the pre-
mium on Korean securities in the international financial markets rose.
Foreign banks then refused to roll over their short-term loans to Korean
financial institutions. As a result, the foreign exchange rate depreciated fur-
ther and the markets' sentiment worsened. Reflecting the deterioration of
the markets' confidence in the Korean economy, the rating agencies
adjusted their sovereign ratings downward again, thereby deepening the
crisis even further. The rating agencies were in fact generating a vicious
cycle of declining ratings and market sentiment.
The immediate effects of the IMF programme were a sharp increase in
the domestic interest rates and a substantial depreciation of the won!dollar
exchange rate. The squeeze in the supply of money together with the
requirement to meet the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio before April dried
up the availability of bank credit, especially to small and medium-sized
firms. In December 1997, the rate of loan defaults jumped to 1.49% from
0.14% a year earlier, and the number of business failures was almost five
times as high as the figure for December 1996.
In 1998, the level of fixed investment is expected to decline by more
than 30% and consumption by almost 10%. Due to the domestic slump,
aggregated demand is expected to fall by more than 5%, despite an expect-
ed 7% rise in exports. The currency depreciation, together with the
decline in domestic demand generated a current account surplus of $3.6
billion in December 1997 and another surplus to the order of $3 billion in
January 1998. A surplus of over $15 billion is forecast for all of 1998.
Annual inflation, in terms of the CPI, will soar to about 10%, while the
unemployment rate is expected to exceed the 5% level. Recent forecasts
suggest that at least two years will pass before Korea manages to recover
from the current crisis.
Contagion and Warning Signs
Warning Signs
While there is ample evidence that the Korean economy has been adverse-
ly affected by the Southeast Asian crisis, this does not mean that the
Korean government and Korean borrowers were not at fault. As discussed
in Section II, they mistakenly believed until the very end that Korea's
strong economic fundamentals would safeguard the economy from a crisis.
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In many respects, Korea looked quite different compared to the Southeast
Asian economies, particularly with regard to its economic fundamentals.
For example, during the 1991-96 period, Korea ran a budget surplus, mon-
etary expansion was moderate, the savings rate was one of the highest in
the world, and capital inflows - which totalled no more than 2.7% of GDP
- were primarily channelled to the non-manufacturing sector for its fixed
investment. A recovery in the export-oriented industries, such as the semi-
conductor and automobile industries, could easily sustain the entire econo-
my and thereby lessen the strains which the excess of non-performing
loans and the current account deficit were exacting on Korea. Moreover,
the real exchange rate remained relatively stable during this time, indicat-
ing no sign of currency overvaluation. Neither the government nor Korean
financial institutions and corporations ever took any serious action which
could have prevented this crisis.
Table 9 Korea's Total External Liabilities
(end of period, billions of dollars)
19951 1996 1997
June Sep. Nov. Dec.
Long-Term Liabilities (A)2 33.1 57.5 60.7 66.6 72.9 86.0
(AlC, %) (42.2) (36.5) (37.1) (39.0) (45.0) (55.7)
I. Financial Institutions 41.5 43.4 47.6 53.2 50.3
1. Domestic Financial Institutions 38.3 39.7 43.8 49.4 46.3
Domestic 24.5 27.9 31.3 31.0 29.9
Offshore 8.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.2
Foreign Branches 5.3 2.2 2.9 8.8 7.3
2. Foreign Financial Institutions 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.0
II. Domestic Firms 13.6 15.1 16.9 17.6 17.6
III. Public 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 18.0
Short-term Liabilities (B) 45.3 100.0 102.8 104.0 88.9 68.4
(B/C, %) (57.8) (63.5) (62.9) (61.0) (55.0) (44.3)
1. Financial Institutions 78.0 77.7 78.3 63.1 43.8
c:J 1. Domestic Financial Institutions 65.2 63.5 62.0 45.9 28.9
Domestic 26.2' 28.5 23.6 18.7 11.7
Offshore 12.7 13.0 13.1 11.3 8.7
Foreign Branches 26.4 22.0 25.3 16.0 8.5
2. Foreign Financial Institutions 12.8 14.2 16.3 17.2 14.9
II. Domestic Firms 22.0 25.1 25.8 25.8 24.7
Total Liabilities (C) 78.4 157.5 163.5 170.6 161.8 154.4
(%) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (l00.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Notes:
1 The figures for 1995 represent external debts as defined by the World Bank definition.
2 Long-term liabilities are those with maturities longer than one year, while short-term
liabilities are less than one year.
Source:
Ministry of Finance and Economy
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However, there had been warning signs of an impending financial crisis
in Korea and Southeast Asia as early as August 1996. The deterioration of
the current accounts of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea in 1996
raised the question of whether these countries could sustain their current
account deficits and whether they were immune to financial crises like
those that have plagued Latin American economies. In the case of Korea,
the sharp deterioration in a number of liquidity indicators was an especially
clear danger signal, but this was overlooked.
By the end of 1996, the share of short-term debt as a percentage of
Korea's total foreign liabilities rose to 60.7%, suggesting that Korean
financial institutions and firms were increasingly borrowing at the short
end of the market (see Tables SA, 5B and 9). Other liquidity indicators also
deteriorated. The ratios of external liabilities to exports and GDP almost
doubled between 1995 and 1996, and the ratio of short-term foreign liabil-
ities to GDP more than doubled during the same period. The short-term
foreign liabilities of financial institutions, .during that time, were three
times as large as the foreign reserve holdings of the Bank of Korea.
Foreign liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities at financial institutions
rose to 11.9% in 1996 from less than 8.9% a year earlier. By then, Korean
commercial banks were already paying 50 basis points above the
Eurodollar rate for their short-term borrowings. It is not a surprise then
that a few foreign investors began to nervously ask themselves if further
financial meltdowns, such as those in Mexico, could be in the making.
Early in 1997, the Korean policymakers were indeed concerned about
the sharp increase in the current account deficit that had occurred in the
preceding year. But at the same time, they were also very optimistic that
the terms of trade, the deterioration of which had primarily been respon-
sible for the growing imbalance, would turn around in favour of Korea and
ease the current account burden~ However, the terms of trade did not
improve and neither did the current account. The volume of non-perform-
ing loans at banking institutions rose to 6.1 % of total loans by June 1997,
up from 4.2 % six months earlier, with the increasing frequency of business
failures. This, together with the capital losses on their holdings of equities,
cut into their earnings. By international standards, many of Korea's finan-
cial institutions were not sound and therefore became vulnerable to finan-
cial crisis.
Contagion Effects
Despite all of Korea's policy and other mistakes, the Korean experience
raises the question of whether the foreign investors should be held in part
responsible for creating the crisis. There is the suspicion that too many
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foreign banks and institutional investors may not have upheld due dili-
gence in their lending to East Asian economies during the 1990s. Returns
were low all over the world, except East Asia. Portfolio investment in the
region had become fashionable, so foreign investors jumped on the band-
wagon and threw vast sums of money at the highest returns in Asia, all too
often without really knowing what they were investing in.
What developments have made foreign investors so drastically change
their expectations as to the future prospects of the Korean economy?
Journalistic accounts, for example, suggest that foreign investors were
increasingly dismayed by and concerned with the structural weaknesses of
the Korean economy. This made Korea a highly risky place for portfolio
investment and bank lending. At a certain point investors were simply fed
up and left. It is true that they have long known and complained about the
lack of transparency in corporate management in Korea. They always
questioned the reliability of balance sheets and income statements of large
corporations and banks, and warned about the risks involved in the cross-
ownership and cross-debt guarantees between the affiliates of Korea's
major conglomerates.8
These problems, however, were not serious enough for them to contem-
plate a sudden withdrawal from Korea before the Southeast Asian currency
crisis erupted. In fact, even well into the month of November 1997,
according to a survey by the Korea Development Institute,9 many foreign
investors were "optimistic" about the future of the Korean economy. Only
two weeks later would they become so negative and then leave all at once,
thus causing a bank-run problem where everyone divests from a country or
a region at the same time, taking their money out of their investments,
almost regardless of whether those investments were good or bad.
The chain of events leading up to the crisis in November therefore
shows that Korea has been adversely affected by the contagion of the
Southeast Asian crisis and, in particular, that the Hong Kong stock market
crash sparked off the exodus by foreign banks and institutional investors
out of Korea. Given the :t:elatively strong economic fundamentals, would
Korea not have come under speculative attack had proper measures been
taken to contain the Southeast Asian crisis?
To answer this question, one must identify the various channels of con-
tagion and their relative significance in the East Asian context. In many
8 Banks and other financial institutions lent large sums of money to the conglomerates.
When these are netted out, the cross-guarantees mean that in many cases the loans to the
chaebols are not backed by any collateral or payment guarantees, giving rise to greater risks
than otherwise. Foreign investors had long been aware of this but thought nothing of it until
the last minute.
9 See the November 18,1997, Korea Herald.
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historical instances, the effects of a currency crisis in one country are trans-
mittedto other countries through a variety of channels such as trade, capi-
tal markets, and flows of speculative money (Kindleberger, 1966, Chapter
8). A recent study by Park and Song (1997) suggests that the institutional
investors' channel may have been the main route through which the Thai
crisis has been spread to other Southeast Asian economies.
It was suggested in Section II that foreign equity investors may have
precipitated the financial crisis in November as they began withdrawing
their funds as early as the first week of September. A simple Granger cau-
sality test was run to examine whether their behaviour leads to changes in
the prices of Korean stocks or is passive in that they respond to price
changes with a lag. Our results are inconclusive; depending on the sample
periods chosen, the test results vary substantially. This means that as far as
the pattern of investment is concerned, domestic investors are not likely to
behave differently from foreign investors. Unlike domestic stockholders,
however, foreign investors could set a foreign exchange crisis in motion
when their fund withdrawal puts depreciatory pressure on the foreign
exchange market, causing reserve losses, as has happened in Korea.
IV Lessons and Reform of the International Financial System
The financial crisis in Korea has demonstrated that both domestic borrow-
ers and foreign lenders are clearly to blame for bringing on the crisis, and
that the IMF has not been as effective as hoped in restoring stability.
Borrowers - usually taking the lion's share of the blame for crises - with
their disregard for prudence and ignorance of risk management, especially
with regard to exchange rate risk, need to be controlled in some way.
Lenders need to be curbed as well. With little else driving them but short-
term profit considerations and the herd mentality, they are capable of dis-
turbing an economy in a catastrophic way as they withdraw their invest-
ments and exit at the first sign of serious danger. These investor
characteristics may call for international regulatory mechanisms to be put
into place. In an increasingly integrated world economy, better means for
managing crises once they erupt need to be worked out, although any
reform of the international financial system at this stage would be difficult
indeed.
1. Overshooting and Moral Hazard
Why has the Korean crisis been so severe in the absence of a large eco-
nomic shock and any measurable deterioration in economic fundamentals?
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What developments triggered the crisis? According to Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (1996), there are three types of distortions that could give rise to
a financial crisis. One type of distortion is asymmetric information and the
herd behaviour on the part of foreign investors and financial institutions.
Another is moral hazard in both the domestic and international financial
systems. The third is any distortion, including a political one, that could
lead to multiple equilibria in the foreign exchange market. All of these dis-
tortions were present in Korea. Not well-informed investors display, suc-
cessively, excessive optimism and then excessive pessimism. Investors fol-
low the lead of other investors, committing funds to markets with good
prospects like the East Asian markets. Bad news or simply a change of sen-
timent often provokes a violent reaction. As was discussed in Section III,
there is evidence that the financial crisis in Korea was triggered by the con-
tagion of the Southeast Asian crisis and, in particular, the speculative attack
on the Hong Kong dollar. Mter what took place in Hong Kong, the
Korean economy suddenly looked vulnerable in the eyes of many foreign
investors. A stampede of frightened investors then followed. The moral
hazard problem and the close presidential race, which cast doubt as to the
prospects for economic reform, accelerated the panic flight of foreign
investors. In the end, the change caused by the expectated contagion of the
Southeast Asian crisis shifted Korea from a relatively stable into a bank-run
equilibrium.
As shown in Tables 3 and 5-A, securitised capital has accounted for
more than 70% of the capital inflows into Korea since the early 1990s.10
The predominance of portfolio investment has made global institutional
investors much more important in international finance. Since they are
driven largely by liquidity and short-term performance considerations,
portfolio capital inflows are obviously far more volatile than bank loans as
portfolio capital can leave a country in only a few hours, whereas medium-
term bank loans cannot. The growing importance of portfolio capital has
made the contagion of a financial crisis more likely, as has been the case in
East Asia. It has also deepened and complicated the management of the
ongoing crisis in Korea.
As noted earlier, foreign equity investors began to withdraw their invest-
ments from the Korean stock market as early as the first week of
September 1997. In retrospect, they may not have precipitated the finan-
cial crisis, but they certainly aggravated it. Taking their cue from these
portfolio investors, foreign banks soon started to refuse to roll over their
10 Securitised capital inflows in Table 5-A include all of the long-term capital inflows,
plus foreigners' portfolio investment and banks' commercial paper financing.
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short-term loans to Korean financial institutions. In other words, financial
market opening together with the predominance of portfolio capital
inflows has permitted, and actually given rise to sudden capital outflows,
resulting in inordinate increases in interest rates and excessive depreciation
of the foreign exchange rate.
The Korean crisis has been exacerbated further by the moral hazard
problem in the Korean banking system and in the lMF programme. As is
widely known, commercial banks and merchant banking corporations have
long operated with implicit government guarantees in Korea. Although a
deposit insurance system is in place, few believe that the government could
allow these institutions to go bankrupt. This guarantee, together with
inadequate regulation, provides incentive to banks to borrow larger
amounts of funds abroad for domestic lending, than they would otherwise
do, and to invest in riskier projects with the expectation that the govern-
ment will bail them out in the event they incur serious losses.
This moral hazard appears to have affected the behaviour of foreign
financial institutions lending to Korean banks and other financial institu-
tions as well. Since they expect to receive national treatment, they also
believe that, like domestic depositors, the payment of principles and inter-
est on their loans is guaranteed by the government, although there is no
formal arrangement of guarantee to that effect. They also know that as a
group they could put pressure on the Korean government to guarantee
repayment. Indeed, when signs of a financial crisis began to appear, this is
precisely what they did, and very successfully. I)ue to this implicit guaran-
tee, foreign banks did not feel the need to conduct careful credit analysis of
the Korean financial institutions to which they were lending vast sums of
money. When some of the symptoms of the crisis began to surface, few
foreign banks were trying to reschedule their loans to troubled Korean
banks, in sharp contrast to what they normally would do if dealing with
delinquent borrowers at their home bases. Even though information on
Korea's corporate sector and financial institutions, including the knowl-
edge that most of the published corporate and banking data are unreliable,
was available, foreign investors did not even try to gather and analyse this
information.
Another type of moral hazard was also found during the Korean finan-
cial crisis. Once it became clear that Korea could not overcome its
impending financial crisis, which was in part precipitated by their fund
withdrawal, international banks and institutional' investors began putting
pressure on the Korean government to seek IMF financing. They have
done this because a debt moratorium would not be an efficient or realistic
mechanism of debt resolution, for the simple reason that there were too
many investors and too many types of investors. Therefore, negotiations
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would not have been feasible. More importantly, the IMF programme
favours creditors more than debtors (Soros, 1998). The fact that the IMF
has come to Korea's aid means that the foreign banks will be able to recov-
er their investments with relative ease and perhaps even profit, as the aus-
tere monetary and fiscal policies that the IMF is requiring of Korea mean
extraordinarily high interest rates.
However, the agreement between the Korean government and the IMF
on the structural reform and rescue package was not sufficient to satisfy the
banks and, as a result, did little to change the markets' sentiment, at least
during December. This is because foreign banks, in view of what was hap-
pening in Indonesia and Thailand, were not sure whether the IMF could
enforce the implementation of financial and real sector reforms during a
political transition period, marked by an inept lame duck government
which would remain in power until the end of February 1998, as well as
great uncertainties surrounding the upcoming presidential election (held
on December 18, 1997). In addition to the Korean government's compli-
ance to the IMF programme, foreign lenders wanted to be assured of the
payments of the principles and interest on their loans; otherwise, they
would not return to the Korean market. 11 They have asked for and
received the provision of a government guarantee on private debt, based
on the grounds that it would facilitate and simplify the negotiations with
Korean financial institutions on the debt restructuring and the supply of
new credit.
Now that the moral hazard and overshooting problem appears to be
rather serious, we have to ask if global institutional investors and interna-
tional commercial banks, whose activities cross national borders, should be
monitored and subject to some types of regulations. At present, capital
flows originating from global institutional investors are completely unreg-
ulated in their source country and even less so internationally. They cer-
tainly have not been regulated in Korea. Griffith-Jones (1996) advocates
the creation of an international supervisory mechanism to which the task
of regulating short-term capital flows could be assigned. There is contro-
versy as to whether such a global governance mechanism would be effec-
tive in stabilising short-term capital movements. Assuming it would be,
which countries or institutions should be responsible for the task? How
should the different financial rules and enforcement mechanisms of differ-
ent countries be coordinated and made uniform? Should the system be
made uniform at a global or at a regional level?
11 To be fair, it is true that Korean officials alluded to the possibility of guaranteeing the
repayment with interest of Korean banks' foreign debts on several occasions, even before the
crisis broke out.
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A global system would of course face opposition and it would be difficult
to negotiate it in the near future. However, since the ED members have
agreed to common rules and supervision, it seems reasonable to ask wheth-
er other countries in different regions should attempt to establish regional
frameworks for financial regulation and supervision. This issue merits fur-
ther discussion, because smaller groups of countries, where institutions are
similar, would naturally face far fewer hurdles on the way to establishing
viable international arrangements. Certain public goods are better provid-
ed through such arrangements, and financial supervision and regulation
would certainly seem to be one of them (Lawrence, 1996).
2. Prevention and Better Management ofFinancial Crises
Another important question to be raised at this point in the ongoing East
Asian currency turmoil is whether the crisis could have been prevented and
could have been better managed once it broke out. It is somewhat discour-
aging that even despite the best efforts of the participants of the G-7
Halifax summit of 1995 to work out effective means of prevention and
management of currency crises, financial turmoil began to rock Southeast
Asia in the summer of 1997, spreading then to other countries. Korea has
been claimed as the latest casualty, with speculation that there could even
be others later on.
Griffith Jones (1996) makes a number of suggestions for crisis preven-
tion, which include: (i) better management of macroeconomic policies; (ii)
fuller disclosure of information to market participants; (iii) establishment
of an early warning system with improved monitoring of national econom-
ic policies; and (iv) regulatory restrictions on capital flows to emerging
markets, both by creditors and debtor countries. Following these sugges-
tions, there was little Korea could do by itself to protect itself from a crisis
except for making more as well as reliable information available.
Kindleberger's study on the causes, characteristics, and propagation of
financial panics and crashes in a historical perspective leaves us little doubt
that financial crises will continue to recur, so long as banks and investors
with propensities for speculative excess cause domestic bank runs.
Likewise, there will always be national economies which .mismanage their
financial industries and macroeconomic policies, thereby inviting banking
and foreign exchange crises. Since financial crises can occur for a number
of reasons, it is not clear whether the symptoms of crises could be detected
and identified beforehand. When the causes of financial crises in individual
countries are domestic in origin, individual governments should be held
responsible for resolving the crises. However, in an increasingly globalised
world economy, the effects of a financial crisis are easily and rapidly trans-
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mitted to other countries, and this contagion, which often draws even
healthy economies into financial turmoil, must be prevented. That is, the
efforts of the international community should focus in particular on the
prevention of financial contagion, not financial crises in individual coun-
tries.
Could the Korean crisis have been prevented? In hindsight, the answer to
this question is an unequivocal yes because Korea would not have been
thrown into turmoil had the Southeast Asian crisis been contained where it
emerged. Could the Korean crisis have been better managed? The management
of the Korean crisis as organised and supervised by the IMF reveals a clas-
sic dilemma of an international lender of last resort. If the IMF had had
the power of global lender of last resort, and let it be known that it was
prepared to supply an unlimited amount of credit until all capital outflows
stopped, as central banks do when they encounter domestic bank runs, it
would be reasonable to argue that the Korean crisis would have been
short-lived. However, the IMF does not have either the mandate of an
international lender of last resort, nor the resources to serve such a role.
The Korean experience also suggests that the presence of a powerful
international lender of last resort would give rise to the moral hazard prob-
lem. Knowing that the rescue is forthcoming, the markets will lose incen-
tive to resolve the crises by themselves. Neither the initial rescue package
agreed upon between the IMF and the Korean government, nor the rescue
funding was able to reverse the markets' excessive pessimism. What was so
surprising and unexpected about the Korean crisis was the markets' lack of
confidence in the IMF rescue efforts. The IMF funding package, though it
was the largest in its history, did not impress the markets as much as it
could have under different circumstances. Only when the G-7 countries
produced additional financing of $8 billion and pleaded with the market
participants to return to the Korean market, even threatening not to dis-
burse the additional commitments, did the withdrawal from Korea stop. It
was as if the international financial community wanted to test whether the
G-7 countries would honour their Halifax commitment.
If this was what the markets are after, it is also not surprising that, as was
the case in the Mexican crisis, a large share of the costs and strains are like-
ly to be borne by the Korean economy and by the official international
support. As evidenced by the debt negotiations between the creditor banks
and the Korean government, foreign banks are not going to share the costs
of crises as much as they should. Quite to the contrary, it appears they are
determined to reap a profit from the crisis, knowing that their market
power will in the end force the public sector to accept their terms for the
resumption of lending. The market power that international banks and
global institutional investors hold is understandably difficult to confront.
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"When it is combined with moral hazard, and when the IMF and G-7 will
in the end serve, as they have, as lenders of last resort, the management of
crises such as that in Korea becomes extremely difficult.
Should there be a lender of last resort in international finance? And how
should this lender, if it is established, mobilise its resources for interven-
tion? In view of the systemic risk posed by the contagion of the East Asian
crisis, could one make a strong case for creating a lender of last resort,
although disagreement would persist over its precise role? To answer this
question, it would be instructive to examine the effectiveness of the IMF's
intervention in the Asian crisis so far.
Although the IMF was not created to deal with systemic risk or to act as
a lender of last resort, it has played such a role during the East Asian crisis,
simply because no other institutional arrangement capable of containing
crises has ever been established and because it offers a framework for col-
lective support in times of individual countries' crises (Kenen, 1996). How
effective has the IMF's intervention been so far? It is too early to judge
since the crisis is still unfolding before us, but the Korean experience sug-
gests that it has not worked as well as was perhaps expected. One can point
to a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of the IMF's signaling role.
One is that the IMF does not come in to rescue a country until after the
collapse of the foreign exchange market, not before. By the time that the
IMF and the Korean government had agreed to a rescue plan, the crisis
had gathered force and was already at its peak. The IMF intervention was
too late and its financing package was not large enough to turn the tide. If
indeed the IMF is going to serve as lender of last resort, the Korean expe-
rience shows that it would have to intervene at an early stage of a specula-
tive attack. The problem here, however, is that governments in distress are
extremely reluctant to ask for IMF assistance. Such a request is tantamount
to admitting policy failure and is therefore a major political risk and
embarrassment.
In most cases, when governments do finally decide to accept an IMF
programme, the succeeding negotiations usually drag on, wasting precious
time while the markets are looking for decisive action. Had new IMF cred-
it been injected earlier, when clear warning signs of crisis were visible in
Korea, the IMF programme could have worked better. To play the role of
lender of last resort, there should be a mechanism or institutional arrange-
ment by which the IMF could intervene automatically to nip speculative
attacks in the bud. Waiting for governments to ask for help on their own
accord will almost always mean waiting too long.
In this regard, a proposal has been made to create a new short-term
financing facility at the IMF, from which the member countries could bor-
row before a crisis happens, with the condition that they accept an IMF
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shadow programme for approval (Griffith-Jones, 1996). The idea of
attaching policy conditionality before the crisis breaks out is meant to
avoid moral hazard - countries mismanaging their economy with the
expectation that they would be rescued in case the markets panic.
However, one must ask how many, and what types of countries, would
mismanage because the IMF stands ready to bail them out in case they fall
into a financial crisis? The more serious problem lies with international
banks and global institutional investors who would lend more money to
these countries than otherwise, knowing that they could be bailed out. The
IMF has little power to regulate their lending, and this lack of supervisory
authority will likely weaken considerably the effectiveness of the short-
term financing facility, as it leaves the IMF powerless to deal with moral
hazard.
The new automatic financing facility, to be effective and avoid moral
hazard, should include measures for regulating and supervising foreign
investors, as much as the member countries requesting the right for an
automatic withdrawal. If controlling capital inflows at their source is not
realistic, then the new facility should allow the member countries willing
to accept the shadow programme to institute a system of prudential regula-
tions on capital account transactions.
Another reason why there were serious questions as to the efficacy of the
IMF programme in Korea, was that it was not flexible enough to account
for the unique characteristics of specific countries. The IMF is often criti-
cised for applying the same programme to all countries, as it has in the
East Asian crises. Requiring tight fiscal and monetary prescriptions, for
example, to a country with neither a fiscal deficit nor an inflation problem
has been controversial. The controversy may also have dampened the
IMF's efforts to shift the markets' sentiments. Admittedly, many of these
industrial and financial reforms are long overdue in Korea, but it is not at
all clear that they could not have been carried out without the IMF's inter-
vention.
Indeed, it is difficult to judge whether the harsh monetary and fiscal
tightening, which the IMF is requiring of Korea, is necessary or even in
the interests of either Korea or the foreign investors. There is obviously a
trade-off between (i) a relatively low domestic market interest rate, with a
larger currency depreciation and with greater exchange rate volatility, and
(ii) a high interest rate with a smaller depreciation and a relatively stable
exchange rate. However, in an economy where firms are highly leveraged,
as they are in Korea, a high-interest rate policy could result in a high fre-
quency of business failures. In fact, these failures could become so high
that they would dislocate the industrial base itself, thereby undermining
the economy's debt servicing capacity. The won/dollar exchange rate
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changes have also been too volatile even during a panic period, often mov-
ing by more than 5% daily in either direction. This naturally raises the
question of whether or not a lowering of the domestic interest rate would
increase the exchange rate volatility, because the monetary easing may help
change the markets' sentiment, as it could improve Korea's debt servicing
capacity in the medium term. This question is essentially an empirical one.
A third reason why the IMF's intervention may have been weakened is
that the standard IMF programme, which puts more emphasis on the formu-
lation of economic policy reforms than on financing, may be less effective in
cases where the creditors involved comprise such a huge and facel~ss mass
of parties, each of whom has a different interest and outlook. It is indeed
high time to ask whether these international banks and global institutional
investors moving vast sums of money across national borders do actually
understand the policy package and take it into consideration in their
investment decisions. The difficulty with the IMF approach is that foreign
investors in most cases may not have the capacity to determine whether the
policy package will work. Even if they do, they may not have the patience
to examine the thrust, objectives, and the effects of the policy package.
Since policy changes and structural reforms are subject to many uncertain-
ties, international banks and global institutional investors cannot afford to
rely on a policy package which is claimed to cure the economic ills of a
country as far away from their bases as Thailand, particularly when they
are preoccupied with the short-term performances of their portfolios.
The East Asian currency crisis, in particular that of Korea, leaves little
doubt that the prevention of contagion of financial crises would be greatly
facilitated if there existed an effective international lender of last resort,
although the presence of such an institution in the future is highly unlikely.
Kindleberger (1966) argues that, while the moral hazard problem could be
severe, there should be an international agency which has de jure respon-
sibility for providing the public good of financial stability (p. 9). To mini-
mise the consequences of moral hazard, he argues that the presence of such
an institution should be doubted, so that such an agency could "leave it
uncertain whether rescue will arrive in time or at all, so as to instill caution
in other speculators, banks, cities, or countries" (pp. 9-10). Despite these
problems, many small, open economies like Korea may have no alternative
but to return to more restrictive capital account regimes in order to safe-
guard themselves against the contagion of financial crises. This in the
absence of mechanisms of multilateral cooperation, including a facility
which serves as a lender of last resort, and~ regardless of whether or not
such regimes would be effective and efficient.
In the case of Korea, practically all of its foreign debt consists of private
foreign liabilities of financial institutions and corporations. Except for the
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consideration of systemic risk, neither the dOlnestic authorities nor the
international lender of last resort should socialise these liabilities. One pos-
sible means of solving the moral hazard problem, which has been discussed
extensively in the domestic context, would be a private insurance scheme
for financial institutions. For a commitment fee, domestic financial institu-
tions in emerging markets could receive standby credit from major inter-
national money centre banks or other willing institutions, to be drawn on
in the event of such emergencies as a bank run. Foreign investors and
depositors might be much less inclined to withdraw their funds from spe-
cific financial institutions or from entire countries if this kind of insurance
were a standard feature of international finance.
Perhaps of equal importance, this system also has the merit of shifting
the cost of financial bailouts from the public sector to where it belongs, the
private sector, thereby further reinforcing the incentive for financial insti-
tutions to borrow and lend more wisely. This ultimately means that there
would be more accountability at financial institutions and that there would
be less possibility of taxpayers having to mop up financial messes.
3. Financial Liberalisation in Emerging Market Economies
Three of the conditionalities required of Korea by the IMF is to all at once
completely open the domestic financial services market, scrap the present
foreign exchange control system - something that would partly entail dereg-
ulation of capital movements - and adopt a free floating exchange rate
system. These are regulatory changes that ordinarily occur over an entire
generation in most countries. An important question is whether these
reforms would be consistent with each other if carried out simultaneously,
and if they will contribute to the stability and efficiency of the domestic
financial system. The Korean experience casts doubt on both the rationale
and effectiveness of these changes.
How should developing countries manage their integration into the glo-
bal system? In view of the recent financial crises in East Asia, it would
seem that they should be very cautious in opening their money and capital
markets. Market opening greatly increases their exposures to speculative
capital movements, which have been found to give rise to speculative bub-
bles and to dramatically destabilise local economies. Should developing
countries delay integration until they can institute regulatory and supervi-
sory systems which are comparable to those of advanced countries, in
terms of standardisation and effectiveness? Or should they liberalise their
financial systems in a big bang style in the expectation that market forces
will in the end stabilise capital movements?
In recent years, western governments have devoted increasing attention
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to securing the rights of access for their financial firms to the markets of
developing economies. However, although these governments know that
the accounting practices and disclosure requirements in developing coun-
tries do not conform to their standards, and that the supervisory financial
authorities do not enforce rules and regulation as tightly as they should,
few western governments have demanded the necessary financial reforms
and changes. Yet, they have been persistent in their demands for equal
access and an outright opening of domestic capital markets (Herring and
Litan, 1995).
Advanced countries have also not made clear their position as to whose
rules should apply to firms and financial institutions in developing coun-
tries, or which nations or regulatory bodies should enforce these rules. As a
result, the financial activities of international financial institutions, espe-
'cially global institutional investors who regularly move vast amounts of
capital across national borders, are not subject to prudential regulations,
and understandably are not scrutinised by regulatory bodies of either home
or recipient countries.
In the process of financial liberalisation in many developing countries,
the domestic regulatory and supervisory authorities are required to abolish
those regulations which hinder the free functioning of the markets. In
many cases, this is necessary as government intervention proves to be more
of a hindrance than a help after an economy matures. However, all too
often, the useful prudential regulations are swept away as well; a classic
case of throwing out the baby with the bath water.
This has serious ramifications. Many institutions and firms in develop-
ing countries are inadequately supervised before deregulation occurs, so
they are suddenly permitted to engage in all kinds of financial activities in
which they have neither experience nor competitive advantage. As they will
nevertheless make forays into international lending and borrowing and
other such businesses, excessive deregulation more often than not sets up
an economy for a major crisis.
Needless to say, the Korean supervisory institutions had no authority to
monitor the activities of those foreign financial institutions which had been
lending all this money to Korean firms and financial institutions, let alone
regulate them.
Every country regulates and supervises its own domestic financial insti-
tutions and markets for a number of reasons, the most important being the
lessening of systemic risk. In the transition from a controlled to a liberal-
ised financial system, the regulatory and supervisory system is often weak-
ened and not yet harmonised with the respective systems of other coun-
tries. Furthermore, except for the IMF, there is no lender of last resort
which could support central banks in case foreign financial institutions call
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in or refuse to roll over their short-term loans to domestic financial institu-
tions, thereby precipitating a crisis. This puts developing countries at a
serious disadvantage and in very real danger. It does not serve the interests
of the international financial community to force developing countries to
open up their financial markets without providing public goods that will
safeguard these countries from currency crises and other systemic risk.
In a small economy, like Korea, which is also now open financially (since
December 1997), internal and external shocks to the domestic markets are
instantaneously transmitted to the foreign exchange market. Especially
when the foreign exchange market is thin and forward arrangements are
not readily available, the spot exchange rate reacts sharply to domestic and
foreign shocks, leading to substantial changes in the real exchange rate by
the day, and sometimes by the hour. This kind of exchange rate instability
can be disruptive to production and investment in an economy open to
international trade. A fundamental question is whether such an economy
fully integrated with the global financial system can maintain a flexible
exchange rate system.
Korea has experimented with both a managed floating and a completely
free floating system. As it was designed, the managed floating system could
not function in the face of a destabilising speculative attack. The band was
widened, as part of the IMF conditionality, but this did nothing to stem
the tide of capital outflows and did not stop the depletion of reserves. Since
then, the nominal exchange rate vis-a.-vis the US dollar has depreciated by
more than 50%, and its movements have been volatile, making the real
exchange rate equally unstable.
So far, it appears that the depreciation and flexibility of the foreign
exchange rate has done very little in the way of restoring foreign investors'
confidence. The difficult question is whether the foreign exchange rate
should be allowed to depreciate continually until the markets' sentiment
turns around. The recent Korean experience is rather negative in this
regard. As Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1996) suggest, emerging market
economies, like Korea, with a large external sector are better advised to
pursue a pragmatic policy that involves limited exchange rate management
and the imposition of limited restrictions on capital movements. In the
long run, they suggest that these countries should contemplate monetary
unification with a larger neighbour. In the case of Korea, Japan is such a
neighbour, but it accounts for less than 20% of Korea's total trade, making
it an impractical neighbour with whom to unify.
The process of worldwide financial integration will lead to creation of a
single global market. To be tenable, such a market system must be sup-
ported by a global financial governance system that includes global rules
and supervision of financial activities. In a domestic economy, the central
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bank stands ready to rescue a healthy bank suffering from a public panic by
extending an unlimited amount of credit, if necessary. In an open econo-
my, the central bank could not playa similar role as lender of last resort if
a bank run ensues as a result of foreign investors' panic. A free floating
system may not prevent a foreign exchange crisis caused by the financial
crisis. As long as these institutional deficiencies of the international finan-
cial system remain, there may be a limit as to which emerging market
economies could deregulate capital account transactions.
V Concluding Remarks: Reflections on the Crisis
The financial crisis in Korea has been much more severe than expected and
has inflicted serious damage on the economy. Korea will not be able to
completely recover from the economic dislocation brought on by the crisis
for a number of years. The Korean experience naturally raises the ques-
tions of whether the crisis, in hindsight, could have been prevented in the
first place and whether it could have been better managed once it broke
out. What general lessons can we derive from the experience, and what are
the implications of the crisis for the reform of the international financial
system?
There is no question that the Korean policymakers are largely respon-
sible for the crisis. They have tinkered with much needed economic
reforms for the real as well as the financial sector of the economy for far
too long, thereby deepening foreign investors' distrust in the government.
Furthermore, in 1997, the Korean policymakers did not pay enough atten-
tion to the sharp deterioration in various liquidity indicators, and to the
complaints of foreign investors about either the non-transparency in the
management of corporations and financial institutions or the reliability of
the published statistics on banking and foreign reserve holdings. They
have tried to defend the won for too long by maintaining a managed float-
ing system, thereby causing the Bank of Korea to lose a substantial amount
of reserves.
At the same time, the deficiencies of the international financial markets
have become more pronounced and have exacerbated the crisis, giving rise
to far more extensive damage. The herd behaviour and information prob-
lems on the part of investors were apparent during the Korean crisis. The
herd behaviour was compounded by moral hazard stemming from the
implicit or expected loan guarantees by the Korean government and the
recourse to IMF rescue financing.
The East Asian crisis in general has shown that in an integrated financial
world, financial crises can be contagious and pose systemic risk. In order to
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prevent financial crises in the future, what reforms or institutional changes
should be contemplated? Creating a new lender of last resort or strength-
ening the role of the lMF· as such a lender is controversial, because few
countries would be inclined to assume the cost of operating such an insti-
tution.
Regulating and monitoring institutional investors at their source coun-
tries is claimed to be impractical and unnecessary. Regulating and moni-
toring foreign lenders by borrowing countries would be regarded as capital
control and completely against the spirit of liberalisation. Even despite the
fact that the lMF has acted as a de facto lender of last resort, many would
object to the idea of giving the organisation regulatory authorities.
In the meantime, Korea has been under pressure, much more so now
after requesting IMF assistance, to completely open up its financial mar-
kets, thereby integrating its domestic market with the world financial
system, which does not provide any public goods for global financial stabil-
ity, while adopting a free floating exchange rate system. This is an unsus-
tainable situation, to say the least. When a domestic financial institution
experiences a run on its deposits, the central bank stands ready to contain
the bank run by making, if necessary, unlimited amounts of credit avail-
able. If the run becomes contagious and affects other domestic banks, the
central bank will have to lend from its holdings of foreign reserves. If it
depletes its holdings of foreign reserves, the country will then be forced to
default on its debt repayments.
Exchange rate depreciation and high interest rates could stop the run on
the banking system, but the Korean experience demonstrates that they
offer no guarantee. The ultimate outcome of the situation depends entirely
on the markets' perception. The system of floating exchange rates does not
appear to be the most efficient arrangement for a small, open economy as
it may cause large fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In a fully integrat-
ed financial world, should the central bank in question be solely respon-
sible for containment of the crisis? Other than the central bank of the
country where the bank run is on, should there be a multilateral organisa-
tion serving as lender of last resort?
Most of the measures proposed so far for the prevention and better
management of financial crises, such as creation of an international lender
of last resort and restructuring the lMF for regulating global institutional
investors, as 'Yell as harmonising rules and enforcement efforts at a region-
al or global level, are not likely to be realised anytime soon. Given. this
reality, and in view of the ongoing financial crisis in East Asia, the interna-
tional financial community should have second thoughts about whether it
would serve the interests of the advanced countries to demand a haphazard
opening of the financial markets of emerging market economies. Until the
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provision of public goods which will safeguard these countries from the
recurrence of financial crises, they should be allowed to throw some sand
in the wheels of international finance, at least at the national level.
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